1991-1992 (3 of 5)

by Kevin Minh Allen
posted 7/14/06

Before Operation Desert Shield was launched in 1991, I didn�ft know anything about Iraq. I never heard of Saddam Hussein and I didn�ft know anything about the Iraqi people. The fact that war was construed as a game and victory guaranteed was not lost on me, though, and I was innately skeptical of the reasons which President Bush, Secretary of Defense Cheney and Secretary of State Baker used to justify waging a fake war against a fake enemy. The president�fs comparison of Hussein to Hitler seemed to be a huge corruption of historical memory, as well as an infantile attempt to inoculate the population against critical judgment. That the United States had a duty to defend a non-player, Kuwait, on the world stage against an equally minor player, Iraq, did not jibe with any common sense foreign policy objective. And, yet, a flimsy rationale was constructed on the front pages of America�fs newspapers and people were galvanized into accepting and applauding the invasion and bombardment of a country that hadn�ft even invaded or even threatened them with life or limb.

Logic and historical perspective never entered the equation because these objective tools would have diverted attention away from the administration�fs mission to destroy the enemy and reset the status quo on its terms. One day, in the high school auditorium, there was a panel discussion between a guy who opposed the war and an ex-military guy who supported the war effort. The one memory of this event that is seared on my brain is me leaving the auditorium in disgust after a shouting match ensued between some students and a faculty member who told them to either support the war or leave the auditorium. As I think back on it, and to be more honest, I was more ambivalent about the whole mission to destroy Hussein�fs regime than I care to admit today. The reason being was because no compelling connection was made between my ultimate survival as a privileged, well-fed American teenager and the taming of the autocratic proclivities of a well-fed Arab dictator. The psychological (and ideological) disconnect I felt was heightened by the absence of any physical confrontation with, or attack by, the enemy. Since no Iraqi sub sank an American battleship, no Iraqi bomber flew over the U.S. and dropped its payload on my hometown or the surrounding area and no battalion of Republican Guards ever came ashore and started killing my family and friends, I questioned the point of the �gwar�h and my government�fs exhortation to support the invasion of another country in another part of the world that appeared to have very little to do with our country�fs well-being and commanding position.

I principally held disdain for those who blindly rallied around the troops because their cliquish thoughtlessness was the cause of their hatred of the Other. Plus, they were consenting to the final judgment of strangers who had shown no animosity toward them and never threatened them with loss of life or property. It was equally troubling for me to live with my parents�f culpability in swallowing the absurd militaristic stance of the Bush administration.

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